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The New Class Actions Law 


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 Visit our new press section to learn about the firm's acclaims by the world's leading legal directories - Press here

 


Mother Rachel Mother Rachel - a translation of an article appearing in the November 2007 "Praklitim" - a publication of the Israeli Bar Association – Tel Aviv District.
At What Cost?

Adv. Sharon Shefer, contributed the Israeli chapter to a publication of a Multi-Jurisdictional guide to litigation costs (published in March 2010) under the name "At What Cost?" - a Lovells Multi-Jurisdictional Guide to litigation costs.

 


 
     
 

Will Payment for the Lease of an Aircraft Print E-mail
Will Payment for the Lease of an Aircraft

be Considered as "Reward" Under the Warsaw Convention? 

By Adv. Peggy Sharon and Adv. Keren Marco 

 

 

Introduction:

In a recent judgement handed down on 4th November 2009 by the Tel Aviv District Court, the Court interpreted the term "for reward" for the applicability of the Warsaw Convention to the crash of a helicopter which was leased.

The Court applied the Warsaw Convention and dismissed the claim against the operator of the aircraft and its insurers due to the fact that the two year limitation period expired prior to filing the claim (C.M 7913/08 in C.C. 1444/06 Chim Nir and Houston Casualty v. David Ben Yitach and the National Insurance Institute).

Facts:

On 24th May 2002 Plaintiff, a film photographer, was injured in a helicopter crash, while filming an advertisement (hereinafter: the Occurrence).

The production company hired Plaintiff and engaged Ofek Co. for the purpose of executing the flight. Ofek leased the helicopter from the operator, Chim Nir which was the carrier.

The carrier and its Insurers filed a motion to strike out the claim due to time-bar since the two year limitation period had lapsed according to the Israeli Carriage by Air Law - 1980 (hereinafter: the Carriage Law), which introduced the Warsaw Convention into the Israeli law.

Plaintiff responded that the Carriage Law and the Warsaw Convention should not apply as there was no air carriage from one place to another as required by the Law and the Convention and as Plaintiff did not have any contractual relationship with the carrier, nor did he purchase a flight ticket for reward.

Discussion:

The District Court accepted the motion and determined that the Carriage Law applied to the occurrence. As a result the claim was dismissed.

In its judgement, the Court interpreted the following terms for the purpose of examining the applicability of the Convention:   

For reward: Section 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides that the air carriage should be for reward, however it does not require that the consideration be paid specifically by the passenger and in fact does not relate to the issue of the identity of the payer.

Since Ofek leased the aircraft and paid consideration for the lease, there is no doubt that a reward for the flight was paid even if it was not by the Plaintiff himself.

Plaintiff referred the Court to a previous case in the matter of C.F. 1375/03 Eindor v. the Estate of Ben David and to the appeal in C.A. 2168/05 (in the same matter) in which the Court did not apply the Convention to an aircraft crash during a pleasure flight.

The Court drew a distinction between the Eindor and the Ben Yitach cases and determined that in the former, the pilot leased the aircraft for the purpose of taking his friends for a pleasure flight, whereas in the current claim, even though Plaintiff himself did not pay for the flight, the flight was for work purposes. The payment which was made by the pilot in the Eindor case cannot be considered as a reward given by his friends which took the flight for pleasure.

Moreover, the Warsaw Convention also applies where the carriage is performed by an "air transport undertaking" for no reward. The Court stated that Plaintiff's flight, which was for the purpose of filming an advertising movie, can be considered as an air transport undertaking in which Plaintiff was a "free passenger" in the framework of his relationship with the carriers.

As to the ticket issue, the Court accepted the statement given in an affidavit according to which a ticket was issued for Plaintiff. It is sufficient that the ticket is issued and no provision in the Warsaw Convention requires that the ticket will be handed to the passenger.

The Court also declined the allegation that Plaintiff was not a "passenger" but rather a "crew member".

Domestic carriage: this term is defined by the Carriage Law as "carriage by air in which the place of departure and the place of destination according to the terms of the agreement between the parties are situated within the territory of Israel...". Plaintiff alleged that the flight did not meet this definition, as the aircraft intended to land in the same place of departure.  

The Court ruled that there is no requirement in the definition of "Domestic Flight" which requires that the departure and the destination locations be different. The requirement of the Law is that both points are within the State of Israel.

Plaintiff relied on a previous judgement of the Haifa District Court in the matter of C.C. 147/01 Rudi Dan v. Chim Nir. In the Rudi Dan case, the aim of the flight was to take a group of parachutists for the purpose of parachuting from the aircraft and the Haifa District Court did not apply the Carriage Law to the accident.

In the present case, the Court ruled that in the Rudi Dan case, the parachutists were not intended to arrive at any specific destination with the aircraft, but only to parachute from it, whereas in the current case, Plaintiff intended to arrive back and land in Herzliya once the filming was completed.

Conclusion:

Although a dismissal of a claim in limine is a radical result, the court ruled under the circumstances of this case,  that the Carriage Law and the Warsaw Convention apply to the claim, hence there was no other way but to dismiss the claim due to lapse of the limitation period.

It should be noted that the question whether it is necessary that the reward for the flight be paid directly by the passenger has not yet been dealt with by the Supreme Court. However, this decision provides a broader interpretation of the term "for reward".

 

 
 
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